




Good news from Vienna is a relief to Ankara 
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After months of harrowing negotiations, the nuclear talks in Vienna have finally 
succeeded, marking the most significant accord between Iran and major world 
powers since Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979. Absent from the festivities, however, 
was one country that worked hard to bring this day forth—Turkey. 
In 2010, the prospects for rapprochement with Iran were as grim as ever. Iran’s 
nuclear facilities were swarming with computer viruses specially designed to get its 
centrifuges spinning to self-destruction. Its nuclear scientists were dying suspicious 
deaths. There was a serious debate around the merits and demerits of a preventive 
strike against Iran—an option Israel was allegedly already considering at the time. 
And at the helm of Iran’s nuclear policy was not, as it is today, an English-fluent, 
doctoral graduate from the University of Denver, but instead the inflammatory, 
obstinate Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who had the dubious honor of ranking eighth in 
Foreign Policy’s ‘Worst of the Worst’ list that year.  
Against such impossible odds, Ankara, along with Brazil, managed to broker a deal 
that would have drastically reduced Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium. The 
arrangement built on a previous proposal mediated by former Egyptian diplomat 
Mohammad ElBaradei, and US officials had confirmed that it was an option “still on 
the table” even a few weeks before the Turkish-Brazilian initiative. 
Yet, when the initiative succeeded in getting Iran on board, the United States balked. 
US officials killed the deal by linking the proposal to Iran’s immediate, permanent 
suspension of its enrichment activities—a bar that even the current agreement fails 
to clear, as it allows Iran to keep 5,060 centrifuges active at Natanz and to enrich 
uranium to 3.67 percent. Additionally, the current deal’s limitations lapse after 15 
years, with gradual and precisely defined increases in Iran’s enrichment capacity 
allowed, starting from the tenth year. The US tone in 2010 was an even worse affront 
than the enrichment requirement, with US officials belittling the new initiative as 
naive (even though the Turkish foreign minister adamantly insisted that Secretary 
Clinton had been briefed on his initiative from the start).  
Much water has passed under the bridge since the United States left Turkey at the 
altar in 2010. As relations have thawed, the United States has availed itself of an 
uneasy partnership with Iran in the fight against the Islamic State while the Gulf 
states’ fears over a resurgent Iran and a retreating United States have mobilized them 
against Iranian influence anywhere and everywhere. Hence, Turkey got caught in a 
struggle for regional dominance between two loose coalitions, one grouped around 
Saudi Arabia, the other around Iran.  
Yet, even though Turkey is not immune to rising fears about Iran’s regional 
ascendancy, cooperation with Iran is still a likelier prospect for the Turks than 
conflict is. First, there is a strategic balance between Turkey and Iran. The frontier 
between the two countries has remained roughly unchanged since the Kasr-i Shirin 
Treaty signed between the Ottoman Turks and Safavid Persian in 1639; there are 
ethnic and sectarian differences, divergent strategic visions, and the Zagros mountain 
range between the two countries, all creating natural boundaries that are difficult to 
redraw. Turkey has no zero-sum strategic competition with Iran comparable to the 
Saudis’ strategic stakes in Bahrain and Yemen or Iran’s territorial disputes with the 
United Arab Emirates. Indeed, most flash points of Iran’s grand strategy (like 
Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain) are not priorities for Turkey. In contrast, Turkey and 
Iran have many converging interests, from thwarting the rise of the Kurds to carrying 
Iranian gas to European markets to balancing Russian power in the Caucasus. 
Second, the sectarian dynamics in Turkey are different from those in Iran’s Gulf 
competitors. Despite reports of rising Shiite-phobia in Turkey, the Shiite Alevis have 
been an integral part of political life in Turkey, and they are especially strong in the 
main opposition party, CHP. They are staunchly secular, with a liberal, Sufi-inspired 
approach to religion. Unlike their Shiite brethren in Tehran, Turkey’s Alevis are to 
Islam what Unitarian Universalists are to Christianity: Iran’s hardline conservatism 
has no appeal to them. Indeed, it was never the Alevis who felt an affinity for Iran’s 
Islamic ideology, but Turkey’s Sunni Islamists. Turkey’s Alevis are not the natural 
constituency that Shiites in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, or Yemen are for Iran. 
Hence, unlike the Saudis or the Emiratis, the Turks do not have much reason to worry 
about a destabilizing influence from Iranian incitement of Shiite discontent. 
The crux of Turkey’s recent troubles with Iran are Syria and to a lesser extent, Iraq. 
Even in those conflicts, there is room for mutual agreement. In Syria, both countries 
increasingly face the reality that they cannot get all they want. With close to two 
million refugees inside its borders, the prospect of an independent Kurdish enclave 
in the north of Syria, and the domestic public’s rising disapproval of the 
government’s regional policies, Turkey has found itself in a tough spot in Syria. Iran, 
too, has pressing domestic concerns to address, and it is already getting stretched too 
thin by its war in Syria. The likeliest outcome in Syria, then, is not a Sunni restoration 
or a Shiite phoenix rising from ashes—it is a fragile power-sharing arrangement 
between coastal Shiites and inland Sunnis, as both have demographics on their side 
in their respective spheres of control. No permanent solution can be brokered without 
both Turkey and Iran, and neither can afford an indefinite war in Syria.  
Similarly, in Iraq, Turkey’s interests are pragmatic, not ideological. Turkey’s chief 
ally in Iraq are not the Sunnis, but the Kurds. Unlike the Gulf monarchies, Turkey 
has no horse in the race in Baghdad as long as its political, economic, and security 
interests— such as energy cooperation with the Kurdish Regional Government and 
keeping control of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged a decades-
long insurgency against the Turkish government—are preserved. Indeed, the 
pragmatic nature of Turkey’s interests in Iraq could even make Turkey a critical 
bargaining partner as Shiites vie for control over Baghdad.  
In conclusion, Turkey’s reaction to a successful deal with Iran will be relief, if not 
revelry. Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear ambitions spares Turkey from having to 
divert its resources to military (and possibly, nuclear) spending. It allows increased 
diplomatic engagement toward a workable solution in Syria and Iraq, and it even 
opens the possibility of a windfall for Turkish business as Iran opens up to global 
markets and starts investing in its crumbling infrastructure, and at a time when 
Turkey faces mounting economic pressures. 
Don’t believe the doomsayers—unlike in Jerusalem or Riyadh, good news from 
Vienna is little cause for grief in Ankara. 
